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1.  Introduction 
 
Interest in monetary integration of Pacific Island countries1 (PICs) received a major boost in 
March 2003 when an Australian Senate Committee (2003) made a recommendation of far 
reaching nature toward ushering in a Pacific Economic and Political Community. The Senate 
Committee, which studied Australia’s relations with the PICs, suggested adoption of the 
Australian dollar as the common currency. Earlier, the successful introduction of the euro in 
Europe, just before the new millennium began was an inspiration to PIC leaders.  As a result, 
two major initiatives were launched in 2002: one aimed at introduction of free trade by 2010 
amongst PICs and the other at promoting closer economic relations with possibilities of 
unhindered trade by 2015 with Australia and New Zealand2.  Gradual trade liberalisation over 
the next few years and free trade among PICs in the first instance were considered as stepping 
stones for promoting the goal of regional economic integration.  
  
Response to the Australian proposal of a single currency, however, was not enthusiastic 
(Chand 2003), as it was felt that Australia had been too quick to propose a common currency, 
which is the nirvana of political and economic integration.  The critics believe that the most 
essential element required for a currency union, namely a regional political solidarity, which 
evolved over a 50-year period in Europe, is absent in the South Pacific. Aside from assessing 
the degree of political commitment, one has also to assess whether there is an economic case 
in the South Pacific for a single currency.  The economic case for a single regional currency 
rests on the fulfilment of certain pre-requirements, known as optimum currency area (OCA) 
conditions, which were originally expounded by Mundell (1961). The OCA conditions were 
subsequently elaborated and updated from time to time by several empirical studies, 
                                                 
1 The 14 PICs are: Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Republic of Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, 
Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu.  These 14 
PICs and the two metropolitan powers in the region, namely Australia and New Zealand are the members of the 
Pacific Islands Forum, the major regional organization. All 16 countries are known as Forum Countries .  
2 There were two agreements signed in 2002. One was the Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA), 
signed by 14 PICs and the other was the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER) signed by 
all 16 Forum countries.  Both the agreements received the necessary number of ratifications and became 
effective in late 2003.   
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including Ng (2002), Bayoumi, Eichengreen and Mauro (2000), Eichengreen and Bayoumi 
(1999), International Monetary Fund (1997, 2001) and de Grauwe (1994).   
 
One of the OCA conditions relates to the existence of a large intra-trade volume among the 
prospective members of a currency union so that there could be immediate and substantial 
gains flowing out of common currency, mainly in terms of savings in transaction costs as 
well as arising out of absence of volatility in bilateral exchange rate movements.  Further, a 
common currency entails a single set of economic, monetary, financial and fiscal policies to 
influence the balance of payments of the region.  Such a single set of policies can be justified 
only when all the prospective member countries face a similar pattern of shocks.  Countries 
experiencing common external shocks would be better suited to a currency union because it 
permits the use of union-wide policies to correct any imbalances, including the adjustment of 
the common currency (Mundell 1961). 
 
The pattern of shocks would determine nature of the cost of surrendering monetary 
sovereignty, as member countries of a currency union cannot follow independent monetary 
and exchange rate policies for adjustment.  If they face similar shocks, the costs of losing 
tools of adjustment would be lower than otherwise (Bayoumi, Eichengreen and Mauro 2000; 
Maskay 2003).  Masson and Taylor (1993) observed that while there were many OCA 
criteria, including openness, intra-trade volume, and labour mobility, the shock-absorption 
criterion combines the net influence of several traditional criteria pointing to the choice of the 
optimal exchange rate.  This particular property eliminates the problems arising out of 
conflicting policy prescriptions, which emanate from the application of individual OCA 
criteria (Maskay 2003). Accordingly, this paper uses the criterion of shock absorption for 
determining whether PICs could be candidates for a currency union with Australia, adopting 
the Australian dollar, or for a currency union amongst themselves, keeping Australia out, 
with a common currency of their own.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The second section provides a brief 
background of the Pacific island economies discussing their current trade patterns; the third 
section deals with the methodology employed in the study for measuring the pattern of 
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underlying disturbances the PICs have been facing and reports the results of the empirical 
analysis.  The fourth and final section presents some conclusions.  
 
 
2. Economic Integration Efforts in the Pacific Island Countries 
 
The PICs exhibit unparalleled diversity of culture and language as well as great variation in 
physical endowments.  Land area varies from country to country: 24sq.km in case of Nauru 
to 462,840sq.km in the case of Papua New Guinea (PNG).  So too is population (Table 1), 
with the most populous nation being PNG (5.1 million) and the least being Niue (2,000).  
While Kiribati and Tuvalu are atoll countries with poor soils and hence limited agricultural 
possibilities, PNG, the Solomon Islands, Fiji, Samoa and Tonga have relatively large tracts of 
fertile land, with substantial agricultural potential.  
 
Open Economies 
Despite these variations, the economic challenges faced by all PICs are similar: small 
domestic markets and remoteness from major markets (Urwin 2004).  They have to depend 
upon imports for almost all basic commodities; and rely upon a very few exports such as fish, 
copra, timber and tourism, and on remittances from migrant seafaring men, to finance their 
imports.  Almost all PICs depend heavily on foreign aid.   Further, being located on the 
hurricane belt, most of the PICs are prone to annual natural disasters.  
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Table 1 
Key Indicators of Pacific Island Countries 
 
Country Land Area Population Exclusive Total Per capita Aid Aid Human Global 
  sq.km ('000) Economic GDP GDP per capita as % of Develpt HDI Rank
    Zone (US$ mil) (US$) (US$) GDP Index (1999) 
   (2002) ('000 sq.km) (2001) (2001) (2000) (2000) (1999)  
                    
Cook Islands 240 19 1,830 51 2,651 420 15.9 0.822 62
Fiji 18,272 799 1,260 1,605 2,008 46 2.3 0.667 101
Kiribati 690 85 3,550 45 530 203 38.4 0.515 129
Marshall Islands 170 51 2,131 102 2,008 1,438 49.3 0.563 121
Micronesia 701 114 2,978 213 1,864 1,010 54.1 0.569 120
Nauru 24 12 320 81 7,017 183 2.6 0.663 103
Niue 259 2 390 7 4,773 2,720 58.6 0.774 70
Palau 487 19 601 129 6,989 2,168 31.1 0.861 46
Papua New Guinea 3,120,000 5,099 468 4,232 830 82 8.5 0.314 164
Samoa 2,857 175 120 177 1,004 208 20.6 0.590 117
Solomon Islands 28,446 418 1,630 300 720 102 14.4 0.371 147
Tonga 699 98 700 173 1,763 252 14.3 0.647 107
Tuvalu 26 11 757 4 345 471 130.0 0.583 118
Vanuatu 12,189 183 680 241 1,319 223 16.8 0.425 140
            
          
Source: US General Accounting Office (2001)        
            Australian Agency for International Development (2001)        
            Asian Development Bank (2003)        
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The PICs are open economies—in several cases this is not because they have low trade 
barriers but because they are small and therefore have large import flows.  Their trade 
volumes in commodities (exports and imports) expressed as percentages of gross domestic 
product are fairly high.  In 2000, they ranged from 120 per cent in Kiribati to 68 per cent in 
Republic of Marshall Islands (RMI).  Exports of PICs are limited in range.  While PNG’s 
major exports are gold, petroleum, copper, timber and coffee, Fiji’s main exports are sugar, 
garments and gold.  For smaller island countries, which have negligible manufacturing 
capacity, reliance on primary exports is much greater.  For Samoa, exports are fish, copra and 
related products; for Tonga squash, fish and root crops; and for Vanuatu, beef, copra and 
cocoa. Thus, PICs are generally more competitive than complementary to each other.  
 
Intra-regional Trade 
Intra-PIC trade has been small (Table 2).  The major intra-regional trading partners are Fiji 
and PNG, understandably because of their significant manufacturing base.  Fiji has been 
exporting to other PICs processed consumer goods in fairly large volumes, such as wheat 
flour, cooking oil and biscuits.  On the other hand, Fiji’s imports from other PICs are 
confined to a very small volume of agricultural commodities.  PNG exports coffee and other 
manufactured goods.  Thus, only these two PICs, PNG and Fiji are substantially diversified. 
In terms of percentages of GDP intra-regional trade volume in 2000 varied from 59 per cent 
in Tuvalu which imports substantial consumer goods from Fiji, to 0.01 percent in the 
Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), which imports most of its consumer goods from the 
United States of America.  In terms of percentages of total trade, intra regional imports range 
from 56 per cent in the case of Tuvalu to 0.02 per cent in the case of FSM.  
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Table 2 
Intra-Regional Exports and Imports of PIC 
 
Countries   Intra-
Reg 
 Intra-
Reg 
Intra-
Reg 
Exports 
to 
Imports 
from 
Exports 
to 
Imports 
from 
Total 
Trade  
    Exports Imports Trade Trade Australia Australia NZ NZ   
    (% of 
Total 
Exports)
(% of 
Total 
Imports)
(% of 
Total 
Trade)
(% of 
GDP) 
(% of 
Total 
Exports) 
(% of 
Total 
Imports)
(% of 
Total 
Exports)
(% of 
Total 
Imports)
(% of 
GDP) 
 
Cook Is Average of 1994-
1997 
- 10.26 9.52 4.9 21.07 7.19 25.51 70.94 51.43
 
  1998 - 11.76 10.83 5.6 28.3 9.75 10.4 68.2 52.45  
  1999 - 10.44 9.82 5.2 9.32 8.2 25.2 68.94 54.85  
  2000 - 18.49 15.68 12.03 33.91 5.97 25.13 60.58 76.73  
   2001 - 11.12 9.74 6.77 29.12 6.1 8.2 74.83 74.4  
  2002 - 6.2 5.6 3.41 22.08 6.85 13.9 79.07 61.5  
Fiji Average of 1994-
1997 
0.31 0.07 0.38 0.505 26.67 39.86 6.99 15.50 76.87
 
  1998 4.73 0.12 2.13 0.73 33.79 44.84 4.31 15.11 86.84  
  1999 6.84 0.1 2.81 0.64 33.02 41.09 4.47 13.10 90.62  
  2000 7.11 0.14 3.35 0.94 25.67 48.71 3.53 13.04 89.62  
   2001 8.33 - 3.7 0.07 19.74 44.26 3.46 14.88 82.5  
  2002 7.21 - 3.02 0.06 19.43 37.31 3.76 17.15 89.26  
Kiribati Average of 1994-
1997 
- 7.8 5.15 11.67 3.02 18.11  3.94 88.78
 
  1998 - 10.01 8.7 17.06 4.05 21.82 - 1.69 102.74  
  1999 - 14 11.37 16.31 2.59 33.08 - 3.02 98.02  
  2000 - 14.21 10.7 22.26 0.24 34.12 - 4.75 80.98  
   2001 - 20.8 11.87 21.53 0.39 37.16 - 2.91 91.87  
   2002 - 12.67 9.14 20.69 0.38 26.6 - 3.58 124.74  
RMI Average of 1994-
1997 
- 0.97 0.71 0.46 - 1.31 - 1.01 83.41
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  1998 - 0.78 0.7 0.35 - 2.01 - 0.71 67.93  
  1999 - 1.16 1.02 0.5 - 1.42 - 0.85 68.94  
  2000 - 1.25 1.05 0.54 - 1.46 - 0.89 68.33  
   2001  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 61.3  
  2002  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 67.62  
FSM Average of 1994-
1997 
0.01 - 0.01 0.01 NA 2.62 - - 65.61
 
  1998 0.19 - 0.02 0.01 NA 4.02 - - 64.71  
  1999 0.2 - 0.02 0.01 NA 19.79 - - 64.39  
  2000 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA - 73.07  
   2001 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 53.05  
  2002 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 52.01  
    
PNG Average of 1994-
1997 
0.03 0.03 0.06 0.11 27.68 51.43 1.39 4.01 88.89
 
  1998 0.21 0.24 0.45 0.21 18.72 52.41 0.69 4.12 94.70  
  1999 0.18 0.30 0.44 0.23 26.29 53.01 0.16 4.1 114.12  
   2000 0.21 0.36 0.57 0.29 29.98 49.54 0.73 3.8 116.45  
   2001 0.1 0.21 0.25 0.2 24.62 51.29 1.35 4.02 94.42  
   2002 0.10 0.13 0.31 0.18 23.74 49.26 1.32 4.4 95.81  
Samoa Average of 1994-
1997 
- 10.49 7.70 6.50 84.18 19.18 6.17 35.15 47.89
 
  1998 - 18.08 11.9 11.6 48.96 16.23 2.74 22.59 51.74  
  1999 - 16.67 12.27 11.52 58.95 14.59 3.68 23.01 57.34  
   2000 - 9.48 13.02 9.48 57.36 27.31 2.37 13.89 38.69   
   2001 - 12.6 9.98 13.64 60.98 13.12 1.42 17.32 59.9  
   2002 - 20.33 14.17 13.43 59.5 15.75 2.05 4.25 56.2  
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Sol. Is. Average of 1994-1997 0.38 0.66 1.04 1.92 1.38 40.92 0.26 7.43 94.27   
 1998 1.07 4.3 5.1 2.66 1.97 42.96 0.35 5.26 108.46   
 1999 1.29 3.7 4.36 2.81 1.34 38.53 0.47 6.29 110.78   
 2000 2.1 6.1 8.2 3.7 2.79 27.5 0.74 5.63 85.89   
   2001 - 7.46 4.4 NA 1.69 29.27 0.28 5.0 NA   
 2002 - 9.1 5.10 NA 0.88 31.31 0.25 5.02 NA   
Tonga Average of 1994-1997 3.08 7.65 6.97 3.76 4.72 33.56 9.66 38.47 51.67   
 1998 6.12 7.41 7.26 4.04 4.53 24.68 13.98 36.17 52.4   
 1999 2.0 9.96 8.79 4.98 3.21 19.98 8.74 37.22 65.7   
 2000 1.65 12.2 9.73 6.65 1.98 10.27 3.68 23.99 79.2   
   2001 2.55 19.73 17.1 12.98 1.56 11.24 4.41 33.21 102.9   
 2002 2.14 21.42 17.0 13.61 1.44 13.2 3.55 30.83 133.7   
Tuvalu Average of 1994-1997 1.04 30.49 45.5 29.23 - 39.41 - 6.31 81.63   
 1998 1.61 59.81 58.39 41.24 - 20.21 - 6.31 70.06   
 1999 5.14 63.84 57.18 45.67 - 18.1 - 5.27 79.87   
 2000 11.39 58.58 56.01 58.77 - 19.57 - 4.57 104.93   
   2001 13.92 65.19 62.48 69.7 - 16.28 - 7.68 52.10   
 2002 9.16 54.32 51.1 NA - 12.9 - 5.21 NA   
             
      
Vanuatu Average of 1994-1997 0.01 0.93 0.94 2.67 4.05 21 0.47 5.19 85.58   
 1998 1.41 5.67 7.08 3.92 0.60 21.67 0.39 4.76 92.32   
 1999 1.19 4.12 5.31 3.98 0.68 17.95 0.44 4.13 122.87   
 2000 4.84 8.55 13.39 5.75 0.54 25.08 0.44 6.93 79.24   
   2001 - 4.72 3.17 3.58 3.01 25.37 1.12 6.57 53.72   
 2002 - 7.11 1.88 4.13 3.20 23.48 0.64 10.69 52.41   
 NA: Not available              
  "-" : negligible                                         
Source: Asian Development Bank (2003)            
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Current Exchange Rate Regimes 
The exchange rate arrangements of PICs vary.  They span the continuum from the exclusive 
use of a foreign currency as legal tender through to an independent and free-floating domestic 
currency (Table 3).  Eight PICs, which do not have an independent domestic currency of their 
own have adopted the national currencies of Australia, New Zealand or the United States: 
Kiribati, Nauru and Tuvalu (the Australian dollar); the Cook Islands and Niue (the New 
Zealand dollar); and FSM, RMI, and Palau (the United States dollar).  Five PICs (Fiji, 
Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu) have their own currencies, pegged to baskets 
of currencies whose composition and weights are generally kept confidential.  PNG, on the 
other hand, has a freely floating exchange rate regime.  Rosales (2001) notes that inflation 
has been higher in PNG and in those countries that have been dollarised.  In fact, the PICs 
with independent currencies seemed to have done better on the inflation front.  Thus, there is 
nothing remarkable to commend any specific exchange rate regime in particular. 
 
However, as noted earlier, adopting a common currency will bring about gains to PICs 
through elimination of currency conversion costs thereby reducing currency transaction costs 
on products and services as well as costs associated with exchange rate fluctuations. The 
theory of OCA indicates that gains would be greater, the greater the volume of intra-trade.  
Since PICs trade a great deal with Australia, gains from adopting the Australian dollar would 
be substantial.  Studies (de Brouwer 2000, Jayaraman 2003) showed that a currency union 
between PICs without Australia would not result in as much gains as would result from a 
larger sized union with Australia.  However, there are uncertainties regarding the sharing of 
seignorage revenue with Australia.  Further, there are no indications as to whether the 
Reserve Bank of Australia would be prepared to act as a lender of last resort to commercial 
banks in crises in PICs (Jayaraman 2004).  
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Table 3 
Growth Rates, Fiscal and External Current Account Balances and Inflation 
 
Average 
GDP 
        Average 
Overall 
Fiscal 
Balance 
        Inflation 
(%) 
        
Growth 
Rate 
                            
(%)          (% of 
GDP) 
        Average         
(1995-
1999) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 (1995-
1999) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 (1995-
1999) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 
Category 
                            
A.     Countries with 
no separate legal 
tender 
                              
  Cook Is -1.2 7.9 5.1 2.2 1.8 -4.2 -1.9 1.5 0.2 -3.2 0.1 1.7 9.5 3.9 2.4 
  Kiribati 4.3 1.6 1.8 0.9 2.5 -3.4 -26.4 7.6 21.4 -13.4 2 0.4 6 3.2 2 
  Marshall Islands -5.1 -3.1 1.6 3.8 NA 11.8 8.7 2.2 14.8 14.1 4.9 1.6 1.7 2 2.5 
  Micronesia -0.5 4.4 1.1 0.8 NA -0.9 -6.9 -6.2 2.5 1.9 5.6 2.1 1.3 -0.2 -0.2 
  Nauru NA NA NA NA NA -41.8 NA NA NA NA 8.9 NA NA NA NA 
  Niue NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
  Palau 4.7 NA NA NA NA 17.5 NA NA NA NA 3.5 NA NA NA NA 
  Tuvalu 5.3 3 4 2 2 4.1 15.4 -54.3 76.5 -16.3 2.8 5.3 1.8 2.6 2.6 
                                
 11
B.      Countries with 
currencies pegged to 
a basket  
                              
  Fiji 2.1 -3.2 3 4.1 5 -3.5 -3.4 -6.6 -5.6 -6.1 3.2 1.1 4.3 0.8 4.1 
  Samoa 4.7 6.9 6.2 1.8 3.5 1.1 -0.7 -2.7 -2.1 -0.6 2.2 1 3.8 8.1 0.1 
  Solomon Islands 2.3 -14.3 -9 -2 -1.9 -3.4 -4.2 -11.5 -11.1 0.9 9.8 7.3 6.8 7.3 8.3 
  Tonga 2.3 6.5 0.5 1.6 1.9 -1.2 0.5 -0.9 -1.6 -3.1 3.3 5.3 6.9 10.4 11.1 
  Vanuatu 1.7 2.7 -2.1 -2.8 1 4.7 -6.8 -3.7 -3.2 -1.1 2.5 2.5 3.7 2 3 
                   
C.    Countries with 
flexible exchange 
rate 
                 
  Papua New Guinea 0.2 -1.2 -2.3 -0.8 2 -2.1 -2 -3.6 -4.1 -1.7 12.9 15.6 9.3 11.8 11.8 
  
  Source:  Rosales (2001),  Asian Development Bank, (2003) 
               United Nations, ESCAP (2004)           
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Nature of Shocks 
PICs in the process of forming a currency union either amongst themselves or with Australia 
have to surrender their monetary sovereignty as they have to abide by a common set of 
monetary policies.  This requires the presence of a high degree of similarity in the shocks 
they have been experiencing (Mundell, 1961).  Countries experiencing common external 
shocks would be better suited to a currency union because it permits the use of union-wide 
policies to correct any imbalances, including the adjustment of the common currency.  Since 
the currency union would have a single monetary policy, the more asymmetric the external 
shocks, the greater would be the risk to the stability of the union.  Countries are less likely to 
face large asymmetric terms of trade shocks if they have similar structures (Masson and 
Pattillo 2001a, 2001b). 
 
Most of the adverse effects of asymmetric shocks, including increases in unemployment and 
declines in income, would be reduced if there were downward flexibility in prices and wages 
(Soltwedel, Dohse and Krieger-Boden 2000).  In the absence of such downward flexibility, 
the presence of considerable mobility of labor between member countries would be a great 
help.  Additionally, if the currency union builds in some provision for a mechanism of fiscal 
transfer to redistribute income or compensate for differences in unemployment between 
member countries, the asymmetry of shocks will be less of a problem (Masson and Pattillo 
2001a, 2001b; de Brouwer 2000; McKinnon 1963; Kenen 1969). 
 
While the possibilities of downward price and wage flexibility, migration from PICs to 
Australia and fiscal transfers are all uncertain at this stage, it is at least worthwhile to check 
whether the PICs and the two advanced countries of the region, namely Australia and New 
Zealand, have been experiencing symmetrical shocks so as to emerge as candidate countries 
for a forming currency union.  The next section deals with the question in detail.  
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3. Empirical Analysis and Results 
 
As Bayoumi and Ostry (1997) observe, there is a limitation to the analysis through 
correlations of output growth across countries because of its failure to make any distinction 
between the underlying disturbances themselves.  For distinguishing temporary from 
permanent shocks affecting a given group of countries across different regions in Europe, the 
Americas and East Asia, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993, 1994) employed Vector 
AutoRegression (VAR) models with restrictions on long run parameters, on the lines of 
Blanchard and Quah (1989).   
 
Model 
Following the aforementioned studies, we employ three-variable Structural VAR (SVAR)3 
open economy models to investigate the nature of shocks affecting the 6 PICs together with 
Australia and New Zealand. The three variables are growth in world output (y*), growth in 
domestic output (y) and price inflation (p), all of which are expressed in annual values. The 
standard aggregate demand and supply framework with an upward–sloping short-run 
aggregate supply curve, a downward-sloping aggregate demand curve and a vertical long- run 
supply curve provides the basis for our study. The SVAR models developed below impose 
restrictions on the long run impulse responses of the variables to a shock to the structural 
innovations. 
The first step in this modelling framework is to formulate and estimate the reduced form 
VAR models: 
 
t 1 t 1 2 t 2 p t p t t tX X X ... X (L)X− − −= Φ +Φ + +Φ + ε = Φ + ε  (1) 
 
where Xt is a covariance stationary vector process containing n endogenous variables, the iΦ  
are (n x n) matrices of reduced form parameters, tε  is a vector white noise process with 
' '
t t t s tE( ) = 0, E( ) = and E( ) = 0 s tεε ε ε Σ ε ε ∀ ≠  and Φ (L) is a polynomial matrix of lag 
length p. 
 
                                                 
3 A complete exposition of SVAR modeling procedures is given in Amisano and Giannini (1997); more concise 
summaries are in Lutkepohl and Kratzig (2004, Chapter 4) and Enders (2004, Chapter 5). 
 14
Moreover, as the process Xt is considered stationary (see Table A1 in the Appendix for 
results of unit root tests), we may conveniently analyse the effects of shocks in the variables 
of the system most easily by inverting (1) into its Wold moving average form: 
 
1
t t n tX A(L) (I (L))
−= ε = −Φ ε  (2) 
 
The elements of A  represent the impulse responses of the components of Xt to shocks to the 
tε  innovations. In the case of Xt ~ I(0) the effects of the shocks are transitory and tend 
toward zero over time, whereas the accumulated responses give the total long run effects of a 
shock. However, because the contemporaneous relations between the variables are not 
modelled explicitly we can expect the reduced form innovations ( tε ) to be 
contemporaneously correlated with each other, hence they are not structural innovations. The 
SVAR models in this study focus on structural moving average representations:  
 
t tX B(L)u=   (3) 
where B(L) is a polynomial matrix in L, the Bs are matrices of structural coefficients  at the 
respective lags, and ut is a vector of serially and contemporaneously uncorrelated, normalised 
structural shocks with 't t n eE(u u ) = I and CC' = Σ . Writing the vector of reduced form 
innovations as a linear combination of the structural innovations, i.e. 
t tCuε = 1t t( u C )−⇒ = ε , we have the relationships4:  
 
t t tX A(L)Cu B(L)u A(L)C B(L)= = ⇒ =  (4) 
 
These relations enable us to identify the structural innovations from their reduced form 
counterparts in the VAR model. Consequently, given knowledge of the elements in the 
matrix C, the structural form (3) can be recovered from the estimates of the reduced form 
representation in (1). In practice, this identification is achieved by imposing restrictions of the 
long run impulse response coefficients. This has the advantage (over short run restrictions) in 
that economic theory usually provides more guidance about long run relationships than about 
short run dynamics.  
 
                                                 
4 This is an example of the C-model presented in Amisano and Giannini (1977, pp.17). 
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In this paper we impose zero restrictions on the elements of the C matrix such that some 
structural shocks do not have long run effects for some of the variables. In order to identify 
our VAR models, each having n = 3 endogenous variables, we need to impose (32-3)/2 = 3 
restrictions on the structural model in (3). Combining (3) and (4), the moving average form of 
the SVAR models can be expressed as: 
 
Xt = t tX A(L)Cu=  (5) 
 
which, for the present case, can be written out as: 
 
*
t 11 12 13 e,t i
t 21 22 23 s,t i
i 0
t 31 32 33 d,t i
y c c c u
y A(L) c c c u
p c c c u
−∞
−
=
−
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥=⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
∑  (6) 
 
where *ty , ty , tp are, respectively, the growth rate in real world output, growth in real 
domestic output and domestic inflation. That is, each variable in the model is the annual 
change in the logarithm level of the underlying variable. 
 
In (5) C is a 3×3 matrix representing the accumulated long-run response of the variables to 
the structural shocks ( e,tu , s,tu , d,tu ), which are interpreted as independent external, supply 
and demand shocks, respectively.  The long-run identifying restrictions are specified in terms 
of the elements of the C matrix.  The focus in this study is on the long run responses of 
domestic growth and inflation to external supply shocks. The external shocks, which are 
assumed to be a combination of both external demand shocks and external supply shocks, 
stem from movements in the world business cycles and are outside the control of the 
domestic economies.  Hence we have three long run restrictions, giving the C matrix as 
follows: 
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21 22
31 32 33
c 0 0
C c c 0
c c c
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
 
In practice, once the reduced form VAR in (1) is estimated, then equations (2)-(6) are used to 
recover the structural shocks, ut.  The results are presented below. 
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Data and Facts 
Among the 14 Pacific Island Countries, national income data on a consistent time series basis 
are available only for 6 PICs (Fiji, Papua New Guinea(PNG), Samoa(SAM), the Solomon 
Islands(SOL), Tonga(TON) and Vanuatu(VAN)). The two major countries are Australia 
(AUS), New Zealand (NZ).  Annual data for the three series for the period 1979-2003 are 
used for estimation5.  
 
We first examine some descriptive statistics on output growth and inflation of the PICs.  As 
shown in Figure 1, Australia, New Zealand and Fiji showed fairly low inflation with annual 
rates around 5.5 percent on average.  By contrast, in the Solomon Island countries, average 
inflation was relatively higher that exceeded 10 percent during examine period.  The rest of 
three PICs, namely, PNG, Samoa, and Vanuatu appear similar inflation rates with around 7.8 
percent.  As for the real output performance, the growth rate in Tonga was on average the 
highest.  Not surprisingly, Australia exhibits a relatively steady high growth rate of 3.28 
percent.  However, Samoa had hardly developed during 1979 to 2003.  By looking at the 
descriptive statistics on output and inflation of each country, we have had a brief view on 
every economic status.   
 
Figure 1 
Growth and Inflation (1979-2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Next, we examine the correlation of real GDP growth and inflation for the 6 PICs and two 
major countries.  The results are shown in Table 4. 
                                                 
5 (It is observed there are some data missing for some countries so that the effective data ranges are as follows: 
The longest common span is 1984-2001. AUS & NZ: 1979 – 2003; FIJI:1979 – 2002; Tonga & PNG & Samoa:  
1979 – 2001; the Solomons Islands: 1981 – 2001;and Vanuatu: 1984 – 2001.  
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Table 4 
Correlation of Real GDP Growth and Inflation for PICs 
 
a. Correlation of Real GDP Growth Series  
 AUS NZ Fiji PNG Samoa Solomons Tonga Vanuatu
AUS 1.000  
NZ 0.355 1.000 
Fiji 0.331 0.067 1.000
PNG -0.148 0.199 0.068 1.000
Samoa 0.501* 0.279 0.193 -0.184 1.000
Solomons 0.112 0.055 0.283 0.136 -0.214 1.000
Tonga -0.343 -0.228 -0.204 -0.298 -0.311 -0.049 1.000
Vanuatu 0.084 -0.173 -0.018 -0.184 -0.241 0.339 0.112 1.000
* Indicates statistical significance at  5%. 
 
b. Correlation of Inflation Series  
 AUS NZ Fiji PNG Samoa Solomons Tonga Vanuatu
AUS 1.000
NZ 0.883* 1.000
Fiji 0.576* 0.533* 1.000
PNG -0.223 -0.342 -0.192 1.000
Samoa 0.606* 0.634* 0.651* -0.286 1.000
Solomons 0.224 0.293 0.423 -0.258 0.219 1.000
Tonga 0.574* 0.580* 0.412 -0.024 0.472 0.269 1.000
Vanuatu 0.499* 0.566* 0.628* -0.193 0.418 0.569* 0.323 1.000
* Indicates statistical significance at  5%. 
 
 
Table 4a shows that only the output growth rates of Australia and Samoa are statistically 
significant correlated.2  The degree of correlation of growth in Australia with other countries 
is relatively weaker.  Those of Tonga and Vanuatu are negatively correlated with most of the 
other countries.  Besides those, growth in PNG is negatively correlated with those of 
Australia and Samoa.  For inflation, the correlation coefficients relating to inflation shown in 
                                                 
2 The test statistic is calculated in the form of ( ) ( )2t(r) r n 2 / 1 r= − − (Mendenhall, Wackerly and 
Scheaffer (1996, pp.512-13)), where r is the estimated correlation coefficient, and n is the number of 
observations (Appendix, Table 1).  The critical value is 2.131451 at 5 per cent significance level with degrees of 
freedom of 15 in all cases.  
 18
Table 4b indicate somewhat stronger relations than for growth. The inflation levels of 
Australia and New Zealand are significantly correlated with each other and with most of the 
other PICs, while that of Fiji is correlated with that of Samoa and Vanuatu.  As for the rest of 
the PICs, only inflation in the Solomon Islands is significant correlated with Vanuatu.  
Inflation in PNG is negatively correlated with the rest of the countries. In total, 13 of the 25 
correlation coefficients are statistically significant at 5%. 
 
On the whole, however, the low and generally insignificant correlations for real GDP growth 
rates and negative correlations suggest that there is no coherent pattern of relationship, 
rendering the case for monetary union among PICs weak.   
 
Demand and Supply Shocks for Each Country 
We have presented the methodology used to recover the supply and demand shocks by 
applying a Structural Vector Autoregressive (SVAR) model with three variables, growth in 
world output, growth in domestic output and prices inflation.  The aggregate demand and 
supply shocks exert different effects on the economy.   
 
Figure 2 depicts the identified demand and supply shocks for Australia, New Zealand and 
Fiji.  The charts in Figure 2 indicate that the supply and demand shocks appear to be 
relatively equally distributed between the positive and the negative.  AUS and NZ seem to 
have similar demand shocks, but for the supply shocks, they follow the opposite way after 
2002.  Demand and supply shocks in Fiji exhibit greater differences compared to the two 
major countries.  This finding seems to indicate that the economic effect did not follow at the 
same pace in the two major countries and one major country in PICs during the considered 
time period.   
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Figure 2 
Accumulated Impulse Response of Domestic Growth and Domestic Inflation  
to External Shocks 
 
 
(Growth response: left; Inflation response: right)
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Table 5 
Correlation of Shocks 
 
      a. Correlation Coefficients of External Shocks 
 AUS NZ Fiji PNG Samoa Solomons Tonga Vanuatu 
AUS 1.000   
NZ 0.882 1.000  
Fiji 0.825 0.758 1.000  
PNG 0.505 0.435* 0.420* 1.000  
Samoa 0.661 0.692 0.527 0.022* 1.000  
Solomons 0.706 0.486 0.685 0.534 0.260* 1.000  
Tonga 0.924 0.811 0.780 0.552 0.599 0.751 1.000 
Vanuatu 0.799 0.709 0.878 0.397* 0.518 0.729 0.752 1.000
    b. Correlation Coefficients of Supply Shocks 
 AUS NZ Fiji PNG Samoa Solomons Tonga Vanuatu
AUS 1.000   
NZ 0.116 1.000  
Fiji 0.043 0.132 1.000  
PNG -0.004 0.168 -0.292 1.000  
Samoa -0.382 0.323 -0.095 0.056 1.000  
Solomons 0.267 0.204 0.153 0.365 -0.066 1.000  
Tonga -0.021 -0.547 -0.016 -0.291 -0.272 -0.357 1.000 
Vanuatu 0.293 -0.184 -0.249 -0.184 -0.519 -0.131 0.138 1.000
    c. Correlation Coefficients of Demand Shocks 
 AUS NZ Fiji PNG Samoa Solomons Tonga Vanuatu
AUS 1.000   
NZ 0.569* 1.000  
Fiji 0.021 -0.340 1.000  
PNG -0.279 -0.349 0.107 1.000  
Samoa 0.174 -0.052 0.404 -0.215 1.000  
Solomons 0.247 0.127 0.011 -0.074 -0.051 1.000  
Tonga -0.175 0.018 -0.091 0.294 0.059 0.326 1.000 
Vanuatu 0.375 0.397 -0.091 -0.472 -0.304 0.193 0.133 1.000
* Statistically significant at 5%. 
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To examine the similarity of shocks between countries, we can compare the correlation 
coefficients for the same type of shock. Table 5 presents detailed individual correlations of 
the various shocks for the PICs.  Looking at the external shocks, only PNG’s is statistically 
significantly correlated with most of the other 7 countries except for Australia, Solomon 
Islands and Tonga, while that of Solomon Islands exhibits a high correlation with that of 
Samoa.  All the correlation coefficients are positive, which may be due to the fact that most 
of the Pacific Island countries are small and possess relatively similar economic structures.  
As for the supply shocks, the correlations are not statistically significant for any of these 
countries, which is consistent with our previous results that supply disturbances vary 
considerably among the three largest economies.  Only the correlation coefficients of demand 
shocks between Australia and New Zealand are statistically significant.  There are both 
positive and negative correlations of demand and supply shocks.  
 
Accumulated Responses of Shocks 
The identification of shocks reveals important information about the symmetry or asymmetry 
of shocks.  If the responses to the same type of shock are different, the shocks can cause 
economic costs in a currency union.  This is because countries cannot use the exchange rate 
to eliminate the disequilibria.  Based on this consideration, we examine the accumulated 
impulse responses of domestic growth and inflation to the external shocks in PICs and check 
whether they exhibit similar patterns, which are shown in Figure 2.  They illustrate output 
and price responses for external shocks for each Pacific Island Countries.  There is a tendency 
that the accumulated response of domestic growth and inflation to external shocks is moving 
towards the zero line regardless of whether the response is positive or negative.    These 
findings are consistent with the economic theory that demand shocks do not exert real effects 
in the long run, while supply shocks have both the positive long-run effect on output and 
negative long-run effect on prices.  
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Figure 3 
Identified Demand and Supply Shocks in Australia, NZ and Fiji 
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On the left hand side of Figure 2, it also shows that Australia, New Zealand and Fiji have 
similar output responses to the external shocks in terms of magnitude and direction.  PNG, 
Tonga and Vanuatu appear to have negative responses.  The accumulated responses of 
domestic inflation to external shocks in Australia and New Zealand show very steady 
increasing trends, while a down-ward sloping shape of responses appears for Fiji, PNG and 
Samoa.  
 
Since there are differences among the countries in the responses to the external shocks, we 
need to examine the dynamic responses in detail by looking at the correlation coefficients of 
the impulse response functions.  According to economic theory, high correlations of response 
of shocks suggest that asymmetric shocks between the countries are not pronounced, which 
implies low costs of monetary union.  Table 6 shows correlation coefficients of accumulated 
responses of domestic growth and inflation to external shocks.  According to Table 6a, the 
two major countries’ responses to external shocks are not statistically significant correlated, 
while Australia’s response is significant correlated with the most of the other PICs.  In PICs, 
the response of Vanuatu’s growth is highly correlated with other countries except for PNG 
and Samoa.  Table 6b shows that the accumulated responses of domestic inflation to external 
shocks are statistically significant correlated with each other except for those of Fiji. 
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Table 6 
Correlation Coefficients 
 
Correlation Coefficients of Accumulated Responses of Domestic Growth to External Shocks. 
 
 AUS NZ Fiji PNG Samoa Solomons Tonga Vanuatu
AUS 1.000  
NZ 0.117 1.000  
Fiji 0.016 -0.541* 1.000  
PNG -0.760* 0.152 0.124 1.000  
Samoa 0.846* -0.307 0.084 -0.890* 1.000  
Solomons 0.849* 0.277 -0.271 -0.486* 0.665* 1.000  
Tonga 0.208 0.981* -0.481 0.068 -0.195 0.329 1.000 
Vanuatu 0.624* 0.635* -0.635* -0.335 0.355 0.855* 0.639* 1.000
* Statistically significant at 5 per cent significance level. 
 
b. Correlation Coefficients of Accumulated Responses of Domestic Inflation to External 
Shocks 
 AUS NZ Fiji PNG Samoa SolomonsTonga Vanuatu 
AUS 1.000  
NZ 0.978* 1.000  
Fiji -0.238 -0.280 1.000  
PNG -0.965* -0.986* 0.424 1.000  
Samoa -0.962* -0.969* 0.091 0.934* 1.000  
Solomons 0.858* 0.824* 0.164 -0.744* -0.835* 1.000  
Tonga 0.912* 0.821* -0.048 -0.788* -0.817* 0.914* 1.000 
Vanuatu 0.848* 0.884* -0.661* -0.945* -0.788* 0.551* 0.631* 1.000
* Statistically significant at 5 per cent significance level. 
 
 
According to the empirical findings, most of the external, demand and supply shocks for the 
Pacific Island countries are not significantly correlated.  Moreover, the asymmetry of the 
shocks implies that the 16 Forum countries are not suitable candidates for a monetary union 
since the a common set of fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies would not be 
appropriate, as the costs involved in the loss of adjustment tools now available to each of 
them would be high.    
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3.  Summary Conclusions 
 
This paper examined the viability of a common currency for the Pacific region comprising 14 
PICs and the two advanced countries in the region, namely Australia and New Zealand. The 
study adopted a SVAR approach to examine the nature of shocks hitting these countries. The 
OCA criterion, which is a pre-requirement to determine the suitability of the countries for 
forming a monetary union, lays down that countries should have experienced a high degree of 
similarity in shocks affecting them so that a common set of policies, fiscal and monetary as 
well as a common exchange rate would be successfully adopted and implements. The study 
results show that there is no coherence in the pattern of shocks experienced by the candidate 
countries, as reflected in various measures.   
 
The logical conclusion is that the time is not ripe for the 14 Pacific island nations and the two 
major metropolitan powers to consider a monetary union.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 1 t-statistics for testing Ho: r(ij)=0 -- ie, no correlation 
 
a. t-statistics for Testing Correlation Coefficients of Growth Series 
 AUS NZ Fiji PNG Samoa Solomons Tonga Vanuatu
AUS   1.000        
NZ   1.469 1.000        
Fiji   1.360  0.261   1.000       
PNG  -0.581  0.789    0.265 1.000      
Samoa  2.241   1.127   0.761   -0.727   1.000    
Solomons   0.435   0.213    1.142   0.531  -0.851   1.000    
Tonga  -1.414  -0.907   -0.806  -1.207  -1.268  -0.189    1.000   
Vanuatu   0.325  -0.679   -0.071  -0.726  -0.963   1.398    0.437    1.000  
NB: Only Samoa_AUS correlation coefficient is statistically significant at 5%. 
5% Critical Value t = 2.131415 ( n=15, df=15) 
 
 
b. t-statistics for Testing Correlation Coefficients of Inflation Series 
 AUS NZ Fiji PNG Samoa Solomons Tonga Vanuatu
AUS   1.000        
NZ  7.270    1.000        
Fiji  2.731   2.438    1.000      
PNG  -0.886  -1.412   -0.757   1.000     
Samoa  2.953   3.171   3.321   -1.155   1.000    
Solomons   0.891   1.188    1.807  -1.035   0.871   1.000    
Tonga  2.718   2.761    1.751  -0.093   2.074   1.083    1.000   
Vanuatu  2.229   2.661   3.129   -0.762   1.781  2.682    1.321    1.000  
NB: Figures in bold italics indicate rejection of Ho: no correlation. 
5% Critical Value t = 2.131415 ( n=15, df=15) 
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c. t-statistics for Testing Correlation Coefficients of External Shocks 
 AUS NZ Fiji PNG Samoa Solomons Tonga Vanuatu
AUS 1.000   
NZ 7.248 1.000  
Fiji 5.660 4.506 1.000  
PNG 2.264 1.870 1.793 1.000  
Samoa 3.411 3.715 2.403 0.087 1.000  
Solomons 3.860 2.153 3.638 2.444 1.042 1.000  
Tonga 9.384 5.360 4.829 2.566 2.895 4.410 1.000 
Vanuatu 5.143 3.892 7.118 1.674 2.344 4.125 4.417 1.000
NB: Figures in bold italics indicate rejection of Ho: no correlation. 
5% Critical Value t = 2.131415 ( n=15, df=15) 
 
 
d. t-statistics for Testing Correlation Coefficients of Supply Shocks 
 AUS NZ Fiji PNG Samoa Solomons Tonga Vanuatu 
AUS 1.000   
NZ 0.451 1.000  
Fiji 0.167 0.516 1.000  
PNG -0.017 0.661 -1.184 1.000  
Samoa -1.600 1.322 -0.370 0.218 1.000  
Solomons 1.071 0.806 0.599 1.517 -0.256 1.000  
Tonga -0.081 -2.531 -0.064 -1.177 -1.096 -1.481 1.000 
Vanuatu 1.187 -0.727 -0.994 -0.724 -2.354 -0.510 0.539 1.000
NB: The correlations are not significant at 5 per cent significance level for each country. 5% 
Critical Value t = 2.131415 ( n=15, df=15) 
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e. t-statistics for Testing Correlation Coefficients of Demand Shocks 
 AUS NZ Fiji PNG Samoa Solomons Tonga Vanuatu
AUS 1.000   
NZ 2.680 1.000  
Fiji 0.082 -1.399 1.000  
PNG -1.124 -1.444 0.416 1.000  
Samoa 0.684 -0.201 1.712 -0.851 1.000  
Solomons 0.989 0.494 0.042 -0.286 -0.197 1.000  
Tonga -0.689 0.070 -0.355 1.191 0.229 1.337 1.000 
Vanuatu 1.565 1.676 -0.353 -2.073 -1.235 0.763 0.520 1.000
NB: Only 1 correlation coefficient statistically significant at 5% (ie, NZ_AUS)  
5% Critical Value t = 2.131415 ( n=15, df=15) 
 
 
f. t-test for Testing Correlation Coefficients of the Accumulated Responses of 
Domestic Growth to External Shocks 
 
 AUS NZ Fiji PNG Samoa Solomons Tonga Vanuatu 
AUS 1.00    
NZ 17.98 1.00   
Fiji -0.95 -1.13 1.00   
PNG -14.29 -22.63 1.81 1.00   
Samoa -13.58 -15.14 0.35 10.13 1.00   
Solomons 6.47 5.64 0.64 -4.31 -5.89 1.00  
Tonga 8.61 5.57 -0.18 -4.95 -5.48 8.71 1.00 
Vanuatu 6.19 7.31 -3.41 -11.15 -4.95 2.55 3.15 1.00
NB: Figures in bold italics indicate rejection of Ho: no correlation. 
5% Critical Value t = 2.131415 ( n=15, df=15) 
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g. t-test for Testing Correlation Coefficients of the Accumulated Responses of 
Domestic Inflation to External Shocks 
 
 AUS NZ Fiji PNG Samoa Solomons Tonga Vanuatu 
AUS 1.00    
NZ 2.12 1.00   
Fiji -2.21 1.75 1.00   
PNG 7.76 0.96 -2.01 1.00   
Samoa 9.04 2.66 -1.76 4.01 1.00   
Solomons -6.78 -1.80 1.83 -4.36 -11.58 1.00  
Tonga -1.05 3.02 9.31 -1.23 -0.93 1.07 1.00 
Vanuatu -9.54 -3.89 0.74 -4.77 -9.69 7.59 -0.12 1.00
NB: Figures in bold italics indicate rejection of Ho: no correlation. 
5% Critical Value t = 2.131415 ( n=15, df=15) 
 
 
Table 7 : Unit Root Tests (Constant, no Trend in test equation) 
  
                World growth (y*) 
    ADF Statistic                p-value  
World          -4.860                          0.0009  
   
 Domestic growth (y) Domestic inflation (p) 
 ADF Statistic p-value ADF Statistic p-value 
AUS -5.700 0.0001 -4.775 0.0011
NZ -4.287 0.0039 -6.009 0.0001
FIJI -5.668 0.0002 -6.928 0.0000
PNG -3.543 0.0188 -4.902 0.0009
SAMOA 5.623 0.0002 -11.87 0.0000
SOLOMONS -5.264 0.0006 -7.822 0.0000
TONGA -6.760 0.0000 -4.871 0.0010
VANUATU -6.261 0.0001 -5.976 0.0001
 
Given the extremely small p-values for the test statistics the null hypothesis of 
nonstationarity is clearly rejected for each series. 
